Abstract
This paper considers the 1810-11 version of the Thatsachen des Bewusstseins as Fichte’s final brush strokes on Kant’s canvas. It takes a closer look at Kant’s claim that there is no such thing as a merely partial representation of space. The question is: what shape does this doctrine take in Fichte’s Thatsachen des Bewusstseins? On the one hand, there is something very similar to Kant’s view in Fichte’s analysis of external perception (äußere Wahrnehmung) and its essential components. On the other hand, this superfi cial resemblance disguises a deeper dissimilarity: almost everything Fichte says on this subject entails a significant shift away from Kant.
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