Perception consciente ou perception inconsciente : quel rapport entre perception et conscience ?

Abstract

PurposesThis paper discusses how the notion of perception can be defined and suggests a reappraisal of the relationship between perception and consciousness. MethodAccording to classic definition, the notion of perception cannot be separated from that of consciousness: perception is the process originating from sensory activity that provides a conscious knowledge of the external world. This definition predominates in modern literature, but it is to some extent contradicted by the usage of the phrase “unconscious perceptions” to refer to a series of clinical phenomena (hysterical manifestations, brain damage) and experimental phenomena (tachistoscopic studies). This is the contradiction we propose to examine. ResultsIt seems judicious to consider that the “unconscious perceptions” noted by science for over a century are not a group of disparate phenomena, but amount to a single phenomenon that is observable when the conditions enabling the appearance of consciousness are not fully met. It then becomes clear that this phenomenon always occurs before the moment when consciousness can potentially appear. DiscussionThe paradoxical term of “unconscious perceptions” evidences the reluctance of the literature to actually envisage a psychic phenomenon falling outside the field of consciousness, and all in all evidences a strong allegiance to Descartes’ thinking, opposed to the principle of an unconscious psychic life. For Descartes, perception – this is the very basis of the classic definition – is sensory activity in that it is able to animate consciousness. The view of Leibniz, according to which the life of the soul is not restricted to mere consciousness, provides a wider definition: perception is the sensory activity able to animate the soul. And precisely, we conclude that it always animates it at an unconscious level, prior to the establishment of consciousness. ConclusionBy admitting the inherently unconscious nature of perception, in a sense we solve our paradox: the term of “unconscious perception” becomes a pleonasm. We also conclude that consciousness is separate from the process of perception, and emerges as an extension of an unconscious psychic space forming in close contact with the body. Thus, we generally take possession of the external world twice: by perceiving it and then by becoming conscious of our perception of it.