Perceived Shared Condemnation Intensifies Punitive Moral Emotions

Naoki Konishi,Kanako Tanaka,Hiroshi Shimizu,Yohsuke Ohtsubo,Tomoko Oe

doi:10.1038/s41598-017-07916-z

Naoki Konishi, Kanako Tanaka + Show 3 more

Open Access

https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-017-07916-z

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Abstract

Punishment facilitates large-scale cooperation among humans, but how punishers, who incur an extra cost of punishment, can successfully compete with non-punishers, who free-ride on the punisher’s policing, poses an evolutionary puzzle. One answer is by coordinating punishment to minimise its cost. Notice, however, that in order to effectively coordinate their punishment, potential punishers must know in advance whether others would also be willing to punish a particular norm violator. Such knowledge might hinder coordination by tempting potential punishers to free-ride on other punishers. Previous research suggests that moral emotions, such as moral outrage and moral disgust, serve as a commitment device and drive people to carry out the costly act of punishment. Accordingly, we tested whether the perception of socially shared condemnation (i.e., knowledge that others also condemn a particular violator) would amplify moral outrage and moral disgust, and diminish empathy for the violator. Study 1 (scenario-based study) revealed that perceived shared condemnation was correlated positively with moral outrage and moral disgust, and negatively with empathy. Study 2 experimentally demonstrated that information indicating that others also condemn a particular norm violation amplified moral outrage. Lastly, Study 3 (autobiographical recall study) confirmed the external validity of the finding.

Highlights

Moral sentiments and sanctions are included in Donald Brown’s list of human universals[1, 2]
None of the 30 scenarios involved readily identifiable victims, as it is known that empathic concern for victims causes vicarious anger, which is conceptually distinct from moral outrage[46]
A similar pattern emerged when we focused on violations that involved an individual victim (Table S12) and on those that did not involve any victim (Table S13)—perceived shared condemnation consistently predicted moral outrage and moral disgust

Summary

Introduction

Moral sentiments and sanctions are included in Donald Brown’s list of human universals[1, 2]. It is difficult to explain how punishers, who incur extra costs of punishment, can outcompete second-order free-riders, who do not punish norm violators[19,20,21]. Field research indicates that punishment is essential to maintain cooperation, people tend to minimise its cost by coordinating punishment against norm violators[22, 23]. A recent theoretical model shows that coordinated punishment is a viable evolutionary explanation for large-scale cooperation among humans[24, 25]. In a recent third-party punishment experiment, individuals low in trait empathy were more inclined to punish an unfair player[43, 44] Based on these findings, we conjectured that diminished empathy would reduce one’s hesitation to witness the norm violator’s suffering and that this would facilitate punishment. For the sake of brevity, we use the term ‘moral emotions’ rather broadly, referring to moral outrage and moral disgust, and to ‘diminished’ empathy for the violator

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