PERAN INFORMASI DAN SELF-SERVING BIAS DALAM AUDITING GAME : UJI HUBUNGAN KEAGENAN ANTARA MANAJER DAN AUDITOR

Abstract

Controversy conclusion have been drawn by Bazerman et al. (1997), that it is impossible for auditors to maintain their objectivity cases of audit failure; are inevitable, even with the most honest auditors. This conclusion based on assumption that auditor is a expected utility maximizer. In other words, there is agency relationship between principal, manager and auditor. Initially, auditor is expected to reduce agency problem between principal and agent through his independence in auditing process. But, to some extent auditor independence is in a question. This hesitation of auditor independence is due to a psychological factor called self serving bias, arising out from continual interaction between auditors and managers. In Indonesia, the independency of auditors has been in question after the collapse of many big companies which is labeled as unqualified opinion following monetary crisis in the middle of 1997s. This paper aims to provide an appraisal of game theory in the agency problem context, and demonstrates that strategic interaction between auditors and managers are not less important to elaborate. By applying a game-theoretic framework, this research shown that there is self serving bias in auditing process, but auditor group affiliation can mitigate this self serving bias. It implies that there is agency problem betwen auditor and principal. This problem can reduce by creating and maintaingin strocng cohesion within auditor team and public accountant association. Key words: agency problem, asymmetry information, auditor independency, auditing game theory, information, self-serving bias.