Abstract
The development of codes of practice for public corporations and the formal regulation essentially imply a standard governance structure regardless of the nature of the corporate business. This seems to be consistent with the 'agency cost' framework, where the board of directors is seen as a mono-dimensional device and the attention is focused thoroughly on the 'monitoring behavior' whereas the cooperation processes within the board are completely neglected. This paper provides new insights into the changes in governance structure as a multiple dimension phenomenon and not only limited to the exogenous institutional environment in which companies operate. The study aims to determine some endogenous variables that have a role in distinguishing between groups of firms with different corporate directing. More precisely, it is analyzed the causal connection between some economic features of the firm and the phenomenon referring to the separation of the roles of Chairman and Ceo, considered one of the most important requirements in the corporate governance arrangements. The above phenomenon, apart from the recent policy statements, could be the outcome of the strategic behavior of the firm and of the market-firm relationship. Therefore, itis possible to characterize a set of factors that will determine the likelihood of a dual Ceo and Chairman in the board.
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