Pensiero in transizione : Heidegger e l'altro inizio della filosofia

Abstract

The central aim of the present paper is to present a systematic interpretation of Heidegger's conception of the other beginning of thought, as this conception is developed in his work Contributions to philosophy. In order to accomplish it, I try initially to demonstrate the problems of a certain reading of the idea of the other beginning as a positive idea implying a certain kind of full description of a new world project and a new ontology. Indeed, the paper argues that the idea of the other beginning arises directly from Heidegger's perception of the problematic situation of his own thought and of the consequent impossibility of giving such a description. This first phase of the paper subsequently gives way to consideration of the main concepts in Heidegger's Contributions to philosophy: event, beginning, history of being and so forth. The idea of the other beginning becomes so at the end an expression for thinking in transition. Not a transition from a certain point (the world of metaphysics) to another (the world of the event), but rather a transition from metaphysics to nowhere. This transition — and this is our most important thesis - implies understanding of the task of thought as a guard of the place in which truth becomes possible.