Peirce on Final Causation

In contemporary Peirce scholarship, there is a consensus that Peirce conceived semeiosis or sign-action as a teleological process, that is to say, as a process directed toward the complete interpretation of the sign.2 If semeiosis is indeed some sort of teleological process, then it must, according to Peirce, involve a combined action of final causation, efficient causation, and chance.3 However, the secondary literature on Peirce's semeiotic does not provide a clear and unambiguous view of the roles of these causal elements within semeiosis. The objective of this chapter then is to clarify the roles within semeiosis of, respectively, final causation, efficient causation, and chance. For the sake of clarity, I will use the expression 'semeiotic causation' for the role of causal elements within semeiosis.4

Teleological theory is shown to rely upon final causation, which in turn also makes use of formal-cause patternings as the ‘that’ for the sake of which events are being intended. In the rise of science over the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the belief crystallized that it was possible to explain events by reducing them to underlying material and efficient causation. Cartesian mathematics made it appear that motion caused patterns to come about and hence was basic to patterns. Modern physics has changed all this, placing the formal cause at the center of explanation. The unseating of material and especially efficient causation in science makes it possible for psychology to formulate telic theory. Formal causation is germane to meaning, and human beings can be seen to behave for the sake of such meaningful patterns. Mechanism is shown to be an instrumentality rather than a basic cause of behavior. Logical learning theory is presented as an example of telic theorizing. It is argued that unless psychology meets the challenge of teleological description it will never emerge as a distinctive area of study with a unique contribution to the family of the sciences.

Leibniz is almost unique among early modern philosophers in giving final causation a central place in his metaphysical system. All changes in created substances, according to Leibniz, have final causes, that is, occur for the sake of some end. There is, however, no consensus among commentators about the details of Leibniz's views on final causation. The least perfect types of changes that created substances undergo are especially puzzling because those changes seem radically different from paradigmatic instances of final causation. Building on my more general discussion of efficient and final causation in ‘Leibniz on Causation – Part 1,’ I will examine and assess some of the rival interpretations of Leibniz's account of final causation.

This chapter discusses the causation ruling the celestial realm in order to ascertain whether Avicenna's determinism extends to his cosmology. In order to understand how God, necessarily existent by itself, determines the existence of beings that are possible in themselves, necessary through another, one has to have a close look at the emanation process through which the celestial realm that governs everything below the sphere of the moon comes into existence. Causation in the supralunary world can be seen to work in two different, but not contradictory, ways, namely as final causation and as efficient causation. In his theory of divine providence and qadar, God's determination of events, Avicenna combines the metaphysical theory that everything is necessary through the first absolute cause with the Islamic view that God determines all events. Avicenna explicitly affirms that nothing exists without having become necessary through God.Keywords: Avicenna; celestial realm; divine providence; supralunary world

O objetivo do artigo é entender o conceito de “causa”, sua efetividade como posicionamento de marcas e os efeitos gerados para o cidadão-consumidor. Buscou-se a teoria da causalidade em C. Peirce, em que o autor traz sua visão triádica sobre o conceito: o acaso, a causação eficiente e a causação final, também chamada de propósito. Aproximando esta concepção teórica das possibilidades de interpretantes gerados, objetivo das campanhas de causa, chegamos aos efeitos de sentido de sensibilização, engajamento e consciência. Por meio da análise de campanhas publicitárias de causa, compreendemos que a semiose genuína não é possível, mas que os efeitos de sentido se dão no nível das sensibilidades e da viabilização para o engajamento social dos consumidores.

It is argued that counselors too readily accept the mechanistic terminology of learning theories to account for client behavior, when in fact such terminology is not capturing what really takes place in the consulting room. Following a definition of agency, classical causation theory is presented. Psychology has patterned itself after Newtonian precepts, which rely upon material and efficient causation. As an antidote to this narrow usage, the concept of telosponsivity is presented. A telosponse is behavior carried out “for the sake of” purposes, and draws from the meaning of formal and final causation. Oppositional meanings in experience are what makes telosponsivity both possible and, indeed, necessary. A review of one counseling theory is carried out, and it is then shown how the mechanistic biases of psychology have been incorporated into this theoretical account. Corrective theoretical measures, in line with an agential view of behavior, are then recommended.

The paper examines the place of power in the action theories of Francisco Suarez and Thomas Hobbes. Power is the capacity to produce or determine outcomes. Two cases of power are examined. The first is freedom or the power of agents to determine for themselves what they do. The second is motivation, which involves a power to which agents are subject, and by which they are moved to pursue a goal. Suarez, in the Metaphysical Disputations, uses Aristotelian causation to model these two forms of power. Freedom is efficient causation, but in a special form that I explain as involving something that ordinary causation does not – the contingent determination of outcomes. Motivating power is final causation, which Suarez characterizes as the power of a goal or end to move us to attain it through its goodness or desirability. Suarez regards these two forms of power as consistent – we can be moved by the goodness of a goal freely to determine for ourselves that we act in order to attain it. Hobbes denied the existence of all forms of power beyond ordinary causation, the power of one motion in matter to determine another. So he denied the very existence both of freedom and of any form of motivating power beyond the ordinary causal power of desires as materially based psychological states to produce actions. The goodness itself of a goal never moves us, whether to desire the goal in the first place or to act in order to attain it. The paper examines Hobbes’s arguments and their consequence – establishing the foundations for Hume’s scepticism about practical reason.

In the early twentieth century, neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory replaced traditional teleological causality as the accepted explanatory basis for biology. Yet, despite this rejection of teleology, biologists continue to resort to the language of purpose and design in order to define function, explain physiological processes, and describe behavior. The legitimacy of such teleological language is currently debated among biologists and philosophers of science. Many biologists and educators argue that teleological language can function as a type of convenient short-hand for describing function while some argue that such language contradicts the fundamentally ateleological nature of evolutionary theory. Others, such as Ernst Mayr, have attempted to redefine teleologyin such a way as to evade any metaphysical implications. However, most discussions regarding the legitimacy of teleological language in biology fail to consider the nature of language itself. Since conceptual language is intrinsically metaphorical, teleological language can be dismissed as decorative if and only if it can be replaced with alternative metaphors without loss of essential meaning. I conclude that, since teleological concepts cannot be abstracted away from biological explanations without loss of meaning and explanatory power, life is inherently teleological. It is the teleological character of life which makes it a unique phenomenon requiring a unique discipline of study distinct from physics or chemistry.

Reductionism is usually taken for granted in many areas of science, neuroscience and psychology being no exceptions. It is often assumed as scientific orthodoxy that human behavior can be reduced to “what the brain does” without recourse to a consideration of cognition. Although many philosophers and ethicists may seek to reduce or eliminate the concept of mind, other philosophers and ethicists have continually pointed out the logical inconsistencies of such an approach. Via a discussion of efficient and final causes in Aristotelian philosophy, I seek to argue that the understanding of human beings as rational and social creatures has guided and should continue to guide our approach to the care and treatment of the mentally ill. Observations concerning rational behavior and cognition, by necessity, have provided the benchmarks by which clinicians evaluate the effectiveness of somatic/pharmacological or psychological/ behavioral interventions: Eliminative reductionism is inappropriate in this area. In approaching issues pertaining to the relationship between human cognitive functioning and neural functioning, the distinction between capacity and vehicle will be used. However, the fact that mental and behavioral functioning can alter neuronal functioning (and vice versa) necessitates that those working with the mentally ill need to know both the efficient causes—the vehicles of certain capacities—and the role of the capacities themselves and how they relate to possible final causes in giving explanations for behavior. These issues become more significant when considering the ethics of treatment choice for those with mental disorders.

It is generally agreed that what distinguishes practical reasoning from more thoughtful reasoning is that practical reasoning properly results in action rather than in conceptual conclusions. There is much disagreement, however, about how appropriate actions follow from practical reasoning and it is commonly supposed that the connection between reasoning and action can neither be truly inferential nor strictly causal. Peirce appears to challenge this common assumption. Although he would agree that conscious and deliberate argumentation results in conceptual conclusions (mental states) rather than directly in practical action, his extended semiotic account of mental activity allows for unconscious (instinctive or habitual) cognitive processing which, though inferential, genuinely concludes in action rather than in conceptual states (logical interpretants). Peirce acknowledges that for practical reasoning to properly conclude in action it is necessary for final (semiotic) causation to operate in conjunction with efficient causation, although how this can be explained remains problematic. Still, his account is rich and promising and has much to contribute to contemporary research on practical reasoning.

The need for systemic approaches in empirical research is becoming increasingly apparent. One systemic approach which suggests consideration of various sources of causation is the Aristotelian model of efficient, material, formal, and final causation. Many programs of research fail to consider each of these sources. The use of highly sophisticated methods of analysis to investigate the influence of variables representing only one type of causation is an example of misplaced precision. Conclusions derived from programs of research would be decidedly strengthened and made more definitive if they were based on research concerning all four Aristotelian sources of causation.

ABSTRACT: With a view to suggesting the possible relevance of Aristotelian thought to current notions of complexity and self-organization, studies Aristotle’s notions of teleology and final causation. After a sketch of the historical process by which such notions were finally rejected in the science of Galileo and Newton, attention is drawn to some contemporary trends in philosophy of science that argue for a return to some (modified) versions of the notion of final causation (I. Prigogine, R. Thom, S. Rosen). These arguments are illustrated by the example of Bénard cells, and the theories of Schneider, Kay, and D. Sagan.

It is argued that a true transdisciplinary information science going from physical information to phenomenological understanding needs a metaphysical framework. Three different kinds of causality are implied: efficient, formal and final. And at least five different levels of existence are needed: 1. The quantum vacuum fields with entangled causation. 2. The physical level with is energy and force-based efficient causation. 3. The informational-chemical level with its formal causation based on pattern fitting. 4. The biological-semiotic level with its non-conscious final causation and 5. The social-linguistic level of self-consciousness with its conscious goal-oriented final causation. To integrate these consistently in an evolutionary theory as emergent levels, neither mechanical determinism nor complexity theory are sufficient because they cannot be a foundation for a theory of lived meaning. C. S. Peirce's triadic semiotic philosophy combined with a cybernetic and systemic view, like N. Luhmann's, could create the framework I call Cybersemiotics.

This chapter begins by identifying three features of Aristotle's teleology, and more generally of an Aristotelian frame of mind about teleology, that may induce suspicion. The first is that an end can serve as a ‘cause’: as well as the sort of causation we all recognize, efficient causation, there are other forms, one of which is teleological causation. The second is the suggestion that things other than agents are influenced by teleology, and that objects can have these ends or purposes non-derivatively from the ends or purposes of agents. The third is that teleological explanation can be fundamental: it need not itself be true in virtue of some underlying efficient causal facts. The chapter then discusses why we should care about teleology, the possibility of final causation, teleology and backward causation, and Aristotelian rocks and telic pyramids.

Reviewed by: Thinking about Causes: From Greek Philosophy to Modern Physics Francesca di Poppa Peter Machamer and Gereon Wolters, editors. Thinking about Causes: From Greek Philosophy to Modern Physics. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007. Pp. vii + 318. Cloth, $75.00 This book contains sixteen essays, presented at the seventh Pittsburgh-Konstanz Colloquium in 2005. It includes historical topics, ranging from ancient Greek thought to late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century philosophy, and contemporary topics, including causal pluralism, epiphenomenalism, and causality in disciplines as different as physics and economics. The concept of causation has been elaborated in many ways, with many different philosophical functions, including its problematic relations to the concept of explanation. The essays cover a variety subjects, and the results are quite disparate. McCord Adams's discussion of medieval philosophers on sacramental causation and Norton's challenge to "causal fundamentalism" in contemporary physics are both about "causes," but their concepts of cause are only tangentially related. Despite its stated aim of bringing "unusual aspects of the history of causality to contemporary attention," the book offers no hint of a historical narrative (although a few of the essays do). Even so, I find this book a valuable addition to a philosophical library. Most of the essays are interesting, although some suffer from lack of detail, probably because of editorial constraints (among the exceptions are Inwood's "Moral Causes" and Shapiro's and Sober's "Epiphenomenalism: The Dos and the Don'ts"). One of the most interesting essays is Marilyn McCord Adams's "Powerless Causes." Medieval philosophers attempted to use the conceptual apparatus of causation to explain how sacramental rituals have some real power to produce grace, in cooperation with divine agency. The attempts collapsed, McCord Adams shows, because of difficulties in making a supernatural event (grace in the soul) even partially dependent on the efficacy of created causes. Throughout the discussion, McCord Adams shows the interconnection, and sometimes confusion, between the causal and the explanatory role of sacraments. It is an interesting, clearly written and fascinating overview of a complex debate, which took place in terms quite different from debates about causation in contemporary metaphysics or philosophy of science. In "From Scholasticism to Modern Physics—and Back?", Robert Schnepf argues that Descartes opens the door to a new argument for occasionalism by introducing a notion of cause that does the work of both formal and efficient causation. He does so by introducing what Schnepf calls the "epistemic approach": causes must meet the epistemic criterion of being clearly and distinctly perceived in their necessary relations to their effects. This is problematic because, as Malebranche remarks, no such necessity can be perceived except between an omnipotent will and its effects. Hence, the only real efficient cause is God. I wish that Schnepf had been more generous with textual quotes and references, and I found his discussion of the conflation between formal and efficient cause insufficient. However, the summary of the Scholastic background and the discussion of the Cartesian metaphysical shift between the Regulae and his more mature philosophy are interesting, and Schnepf's case for how Descartes helped revive occasionalism is persuasive. Both Laura Snyder's "Freedom from Necessity" and Paolo Parrini's "Mill on Causation and Historical Turn in Philosophy of Science" start from a reading of Mill's theory of causation [End Page 243] in the context of his anti-intuitionism and his political struggle for individual liberty against the tyranny of custom. Snyder concludes with an invitation to include historical considerations in interpretation, under penalty of reading an "artificial construction" rather than the actual philosopher. Parrini argues that the textual evidence is certainly compatible with Snyder's conclusion that Mill's discussion of causation was influenced by his political agenda, but it is also compatible with a different interpretation, i.e. that a political agenda initially influenced Mill's discussion of causation, which later took an autonomous turn. Parrini then warns against the excesses of the "historical turn": there is room for evaluating a philosopher's ideas outside of their immediate background, especially if we are to compare them to alternative systems or examine their internal coherence. Both discussions of Mill's concept of causation are very interesting...