Peirce on Explanation

Abstract

There has been a recent focused effort in philosophical scholarship to bridge the perceived divide between pragmatism and analytic philoso- phy. This divide, it has been suggested, is over philosophical doctrines, methods, and even aims. This is not to say there has not been fruitful— even if antagonistic—dialogue between these two philosophical tradi- tions. Clearly there has been, e.g., Russell's famous (or infamous) disputes with James and Dewey. Clearly also, there has been direct philosophical influence from one tradition to the other, e.g., Peirce and Dewey on Quine's naturalistic works. Nevertheless, all too often the seminal works of pragmatists, especially the classical Big Three, have not been mined by analytic philosophers, e.g., Peirce's writings on vagueness or on reference. This neglect has been, I believe, to the detri- ment of analytic philosophy. I intend this paper to be one step in cor- recting this neglect by suggesting both that Peirce's take on (scientific) explanation is a corrective to the prevailing models of explanation and that these models supply (at least in part) fecund additions to Peirce's views. First I will lay out four contemporary models of explanation, fol- lowed by an explication of Peirce's views. Then I will suggest how each of these two approaches (the analytic models and the Peircean model) can help inform the other.