Peer Influence on Managerial Honesty: The Moderating Role of Earnings Position

Abstract

This study uses a budgeting experiment to examine the effects of peer influence and firm earnings position on managerial honesty. In the experiment, participants report production costs to request funds from the firm based on their actual private cost information. The firm’s earnings position is manipulated at two levels, a gain condition and an edge condition, and the authors find that participants overstate costs (i.e., are less honest) to a greater extent in the dishonest peer influence condition than in the honest peer influence condition. The authors also find that the effect of peer influence on managerial honesty is context dependent. Specifically, participants respond to both dishonest and honest peer influence in the gain condition but they do not respond to peer influence in the edge condition. This study provides evidence for honest peer influence on honesty and it highlights the role of earnings position on the effect of peer influence on honesty. Controlling the disclosure of certain peer information is not possible because individuals can learn about peer information (honest or dishonest) formally or informally. Such uncontrollable peer information may be harmful to firms. The results suggest firms that provide managers with the consequences of managerial budgeting on the firm operational outcomes can neutralize the effect of peer influence on managerial honesty when managers’ budgeting decisions significantly affect firm profits.