Peacekeeping and the Challenge of Consent

Abstract

Abstract This chapter analyses the negotiations towards the hybrid UN/AU peacekeeping operation in Darfur. Security Council members sought to move away from the pre-existing AU peacekeeping operation because donors were reluctant to continue funding it, whereas UN peacekeeping is funded via assessed contributions from all UN member states. This priority aligned with civil society demands for greater civilian protection in Darfur. The authorization of the hybrid operation was a circuitous process because the Security Council first authorized UN peacekeeping, which was rejected outright by Sudan. This first attempt can be understood in terms of the external legitimation practice of ‘doing something’, whereby Western drafters prioritized taking action even though it was known in advance that Khartoum would not offer the requisite consent. It was the UN Secretariat, using its legitimated authority, that proposed the plan for hybrid peacekeeping and pitched it to both Security Council member states and Khartoum. China shifted from backing Khartoum in the first round of negotiations to lobbying Khartoum for consent in the second round of negotiations, which was instrumental in achieving Sudanese acquiescence. This shift can be understood as an external legitimation practice in that China shifted position towards one that would garner greater legitimacy from international peers. When negotiating the hybrid peacekeeping operation, Security Council members refocused on normal internal legitimation practices—unanimity and regional support—with the understanding that legitimacy was central to implementation.