Abstract

In 2011, Cote d’Ivoire emerged from a protracted politico-military crisis not through peace negotiations, but thanks to the military defeat of former president Laurent Gbagbo and his associates. Relatively little has been written about the restoration of peace after a decisive military victory and about experiences of post-conflict reconstructions where the international community does not play a leading role. Quantitative scholarship has contended that victory makes restoring peace relatively uncomplicated. In contrast, strategic scholarship has insisted that winning the war does not automatically mean ‘winning the peace’. Victors, especially former insurgents, have to maintain cohesion within the winning coalition and to co-opt or repress residual resistance from the vanquished if they want to consolidate their rule. Moreover, former insurgents often struggle to implement their vision of post-conflict governance. In Cote d’Ivoire, the winning coalition showed risks of implosion after 2011, but has been up to now able to contain them. The Ouattara administration has been able to develop its own vision of post conflict reconstruction, drawing from Ivorian political tradition and the president’s distinctive personality. However, this political project faces future obstacles, particularly in view of Ouattara’s probable retirement from politics in 2020.

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