Abstract
The experiment presented in this paper examines the influence of varying grand coalition payoff in a sequence of nine 3-person games in characteristic function form. The central tendency of observed payoff divisions in the 3-person coalition is compared with different solution concepts. The kernel overestimates and the Shapley value underestimates the deviations from the equal split. The convex linear combination of the nucleolus and the equal split with a weight of approximately 1 4 for the equal split, or equivalently of the nucleolus and the Shapley value with a weight of 1 2 for each yields the best fit; such a convex linear combination can be supported as a good predictor of the final outcomes.
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