Abstract

Payments for Environmental Services (PES) schemes present a new approach that creates a conditional benefit transfer between upland providers of environmental services and the downstream beneficiaries of these services. Such schemes can take the advantage of upland-lowland interactions in generating environmental benefits while improving the livelihoods of upper-catchment agricultural households. The past few years have witnessed a surge of interest in the development of PES schemes in Asia. The Vietnamese Government expressed recently its interest in starting such a scheme to protect fragile upper-catchments whose degradations are causing problems, among others, on hydro-electric infrastructures. Northern provinces of Vietnam are characterized by biophysical, social, and cultural diversity. The region suffers from severe environmental problems such as deforestation, soil degradation, and loss of biodiversity. As a result, the livelihoods of agricultural households may be unsustainable. Moreover, they are also producing negative externalities for lower parts of the countries. However, households in upper catchments are heterogeneous because they have unequal access to natural resources. The upper-catchments are generally composed of a narrow bottom-valley, where irrigated rice fields are found, and of surrounding sloping land with upland rice, maize and cassava. The differential access to those compartments of the watershed has some important consequences in terms of household farming practices and livelihood strategies. The proposed paper is organized in two parts. The first part reports farm household surveys and proposes a typology of farmers living in two typical small watersheds. The second, through a simplified model of farms analyses how the poorest households would respond to such a PES scheme. Results of farm surveys showed that access to lowland paddies is uneven among agricultural households. Even in situations of apparent abundance of water, an important share of the villagers had little access to water during the months where it would be critically needed to cultivate a second rice crop. Therefore, watershed governance has far-reaching consequences that need to be recognized. We developed a recursive dynamic model shifting cultivators that integrated the dynamics of soil fertility over time and farmers decisions in order to analyse their potential participations in PES schemes. We simulated farmers without paddy land, and without access to markets. The model predicted that unless in-kind grain transfers are feasible, studied agricultural households are unlikely to participate voluntarily into a land retirement program. Overall, there is no easy solution to tackle both environmental and welfare issues of poorest potential suppliers of environmental services in the upper-catchments of Northern provinces of Vietnam, especially when they do not have access to markets.

Highlights

  • Payments for Environmental Services (PES) schemes present a new approach that focuses directly on creating a conditional benefit transfer between providers of environmental services, in this case the uplanders, and the downstream beneficiaries of these services

  • We examine the viability of PES schemes targeted at Payments for environmental services in upper-catchments of Vietnam agricultural households of the upper-catchments in Northern Vietnam

  • PES schemes are based on the principles that those who benefit from environmental services should pay for them, and that those who contribute to generating these services should be compensated for providing them

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Summary

Introduction

Payments for Environmental Services (PES) schemes present a new approach that focuses directly on creating a conditional benefit transfer between providers of environmental services, in this case the uplanders, and the downstream beneficiaries of these services. The approach seeks to create mechanisms that internalize what would otherwise be an externality (Pagiola et al 2008) Such schemes can take the advantage of uplandlowland interactions in generating environmental benefits while improving the livelihoods of upper-catchment agricultural households. The main objective of this paper is to review the potential response of upland households to a PES scheme that rewards them to set aside part of land for the production of environmental services. This review focuses on papers that unveil the possibility of negative impact on poor farming households that can not participate as service providers in a potential PES program. In the third section of the paper, we develop a farm household model, and show how it can be used to anticipate farmers’ participation in potential PES programs and impact on their production strategy. We find that farmers are unlikely to participate in a voluntary land retirement program unless they are ‘compensated’ for the loss in food production through in-kind grain transfers or through the promotion of technologies that increase food yields

Pes and poverty
Study area
A typology of household situations
Modelling land use decisions of shifting cultivators
Household objectives
Temporal considerations
Model structure and dynamics
Nutrient dynamics
Land productivity
Land use and labour allocation
Identification of the most favourable scenario
4.10. Base simulation settings and model behaviour
Impact of proposed pes schemes
Discussion and conclusion
Findings
Literature cited
Full Text
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