Abstract
We examine the causal effect of pay transparency on innovation performance of firms and inventors. Our test exploits the staggered adoption of state-level pay secrecy laws, which enhance pay transparency in the workplace. We find a significant increase in innovation by firms headquartered in states that have passed such laws relative to firms elsewhere. This effect is more pronounced for firms in states with lower levels of pre-existing pay transparency. We further show that pay secrecy laws promote innovation by increasing the productivity of incumbent inventors (especially minority inventors), attracting minority inventors from other states, and enhancing the diversity of inventor teams.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
