Paul of Venice’s metaphysics of artefacts

Abstract

ABSTRACTThis paper examines the theory of artefacts presented by the 15th-century thinker Paul of Venice, paying special attention to the views of authors often referred to as ‘nominalists’ (e.g. Ockham, Buridan, Albert of Saxony), against whom Paul is arguing. In contrast to the position of artefact-nominalists, according to whom there is no need to posit artificial forms to account for the production and existence of artefacts, Paul claims that our metaphysical explanations of the status of artefacts cannot do without such forms. After sketching the broader context of this discussion (the Aristotelian roots of the debate, artefact-realism vs. artefact-nominalism, kinds of artefacts), the paper presents the important themes of the Ockham-Burley controversy regarding artefacts, to which Paul of Venice is referring. After that, Paul’s views are presented: first, regarding the status of shapes, then, regarding the status of artefacts. The paper reviews some of the arguments that Paul employs to defend artefact-realism against the objections put forward by artefact-nominalists. The conclusion is that despite its intricacy, Paul’s theory fails to be entirely convincing and coherent.