Paul Grice and the Philosophy of Ordinary Language

Abstract

The story of Paul Grice’s relationship to what has become generally known as ‘ordinary language philosophy’ (OLP) is long and involved. It is one of initial enthusiasm, growing uneasiness and distance, but continued loyalty. Along with John L. Austin and Peter F. Strawson, Grice is one of the philosophers now most readily associated with the Oxford-based movement. Indeed his theory of conversation is widely regarded, among linguists at least, as one of the most successful products of OLP. In his development of this theory Grice certainly drew on a recognizably ‘ordinary language’ approach. And he continued to return to this in his later work, some of it conducted decades after the decline of OLP and thousands of miles away from Oxford. But there is another side to the story. Grice himself had reservations about OLP and increasingly voiced concerns about its limitations. Much of his own philosophical work, including the theory of conversation, relies on assumptions, strategies and methodologies that contrast sharply with those of OLP.