Patterson on Tarski’s Definition of Logical Consequence

Abstract

We still do not know against what historical/philosophical background and motivation Tarski’s definition of logical consequence was introduced, even if it has had such a strong influence. In view of the centrality of the notion of logical consequence in logic and philosophy of logic, it is rather shocking. There must be various intertwined reasons to blame for this uncomfortable situation. There has been remarkable progress achieved recently on the history of analytic philosophy and modern logic. In view of the recent developments of the controversies involved, however, we will have to wait years to resolve all these uneasiness. In this gloomy situation, Douglas Patterson’s recent study of Tarski’s philosophy of language and logic seems to have the potential to turn out to be a ground breaking achievement (Patterson 2012). This chapter aims at uncovering the state-of-the-art and fathoming the future directions of the research in this problem area by examining critically some unclear components of Patterson’s study.