Patterns of Distribution in Spatial Games

Abstract

Experimental results from two-dimensional spatial contexts suggest that cooperative theories, such as the core in nonsidepayment games and the competitive solution in games without a core, are accurate predictors of committee outcomes. Yet in discrete settings, committees often select outcomes that deviate significantly from these solutions. These anomalous results seem to depend on the distribution of cardinal payoffs, an aspect of the experimental setting previously ignored in two-dimensional spatial contexts. The two-dimensional experiments reported in this article examine the predictive ability of the core and competitive solution under payoff functions designed to create a region of cardinally fair alternatives distinct from the predictions of these solution concepts. The argument is made that individuals inclined toward fair distributions of rewards attempt interpersonal comparisons of cardinal values, even under conditions of partial information, and that it is these imperfect attempts at interpersonal comparisons that ultimately move committees away from the predictions of the core and competitive solution.