Patterning in Citations: An Analysis of References to George Herbert Mead

Abstract

Unlike other name brand sociologists such as Lunberg, Parsons, and Homans, the work of George Herbert Mead has engendered relatively little controversy. He has not served as a bete noire for sociologists whose theoretical orientations differ from the interactionist perspective. The question emerges, then, as to why Mead's writings have not been the target of sociological vigilantes. At first glance, Mead's immunity is somewhat surprising since he could have been castigated as an interloper. Here was a professional philosopher poaching on a discipline that had not completely legitimated itself in academia. Mead's credentials might also have been suspect. He had no formal training in sociology and ? save for his knowledge of Cooley, Summer, Spencer, and Marx ? he did not pay homage to the founding fathers of sociology. Mead broke new ground but, with the exception of references to Cooley, generally did so without tipping his hat to earlier work done by sociologists. One might also mention that as a philosopher Mead was not a particularly prominent figure in the United States; Strauss (1964:ix) not? that Mead was not mentioned in Pratt's What Is Pragmatism (1909) nor in Perry's Present Philosophical Tendencies (1912). One can hardly attribute Mead's favorable reception by sociologists to an immaginative writing style. Those writings of Mead's with which most sociologists are familiar are largely comprised of a loose accumulation of lecture notes, drafts of essays, and unfinished manuscripts. His writings consist, in considerable part, of alternative formulations, highly repetitive materials, and sketchily developed ideas. Most of this is due, of course, not only to the fact that many of the ideas expressed in these works were formulated during different periods of Mead's career, but