Patronage Politics and the Behavior of Armed Groups

Abstract

The structures of pre-conflict patronage politics in West Africa play a major role in shaping the organization and behavior of armed groups that have appeared in that region since the 1990s. Patronage networks provide the social context in which armed group leaders arise and influences how they obtain and use resources. It weighs heavily in influencing who they recruit and how fighters and leaders define their goals. Two general principles emerge out of this investigation. First, political leaders who enjoyed close ties to prewar capital-based patronage networks tend to organize predatory armed groups. Leaders who come from communities that were marginal to these networks organize armed groups that are more likely to benefit local communities and take community norms more seriously. Overall, the latter maintain more stable internal organizations and are less prone to commit extreme human rights violations, at least in comparison to their better connected rivals. Evidence indicates that leaders of these groups often are tempted to pursue more predatory strategies. They discover, however, that this social context in which they gather resources and recruit fighters inhibits the pursuit of such strategies.