Patronage and authoritarian co-optation of the military: Theory with evidence from post-Mao China

Abstract

How do dictators cultivate support among military leaders to mitigate their “guardianship dilemma”? A prominent thesis suggests autocrats in regimes with a dominant political party seek to prolong their rule by lavishing with career rewards underlings in their patronage networks built over a track record of trust and loyalty. This can be daunting for post-founding-generation dictators with little military experience and lacking prior interaction with their generals, an increasingly common challenge in party autocracies. Proposing a simple framework to think about the challenges of co-opting the military leaders for autocrats with different career background, I argue that party autocrats with no military career credentials can build new allegiance by bestowing job-related patronage on the military leaders appointed by themselves at the expense of legacy generals inherited from their predecessors. Analyzing yearly career outcomes of leaders of the regional commands of the People’s Liberation Army in post-Mao China, I find strong empirical support for the main argument. Compared with personal appointees, legacy generals were 63 percent less likely to be promoted under autocrats without military experience, but their odds of promotion did not seem to differ under autocrats boasting military career background. This study contributes to research on authoritarian efforts to tame internal threats, clientelism, party dictatorships, leader traits, and China’s civil-military ties.