Patients' substantialization of disease, the hybrid symptom and metaphysical care.

Abstract

In the context of current scholarship concerned with facilitating integration between the biomedical and the patient-centred models of care, the article suggests that disease brings about an ontological disruption in patients, which is not directly addressed in either model, and may interfere with treatment and therapy outcomes if not met with a type of care termed here as 'metaphysical'. The receipt of diagnosis and medical care can give patients the sense that they are ontologically diminished, or less of a human, and along with physicians' approaches to and discourses about disease, may prompt them to seek ontological restoration or security in the same way as psychologically traumatized patients sometimes do: by treating the disease and/or the experience of harm associated with it as a thing that exists per se. I call this 'substantialization' of disease (or harm) and draw on Augustine's theory of non-substantial deficiencies (physiological and moral) and on Plato's and Plotinus's different takes on such defects in order to discuss what substantialization can do for patients. Based on literature that examines patients' ways of talking about and living with their disease, I speculate that substantialization can generate a 'hybrid symptom', consisting in patterns of exercising agency which may predispose to non-adherence. Ways in which physicians could provide metaphysical care are proposed, along with an understanding of chronic patients as hybrid ontological and agentic units, which draws on theories of enactive cognition. I opine that metaphysical care may facilitate integration between the depersonalized and personalized models of care.