Pathology as a phenomenological tool

Havi Carel

doi:10.1007/s11007-021-09538-9

Abstract

The phenomenological method (or rather, methods) has been fruitfully used to study the experience of illness in recent years. However, the role of illness is not merely that of a passive object for phenomenological scrutiny. I propose that illness, and pathology more generally, can be developed into a phenomenological method in their own right. I claim that studying cases of pathology, breakdown, and illness offer illumination not only of these experiences, but also of normal function and the tacit background that underpins it. In particular, I claim that the study of embodiment can be greatly enhanced, and indeed would be incomplete, without attending to bodily breakdown and what I term bodily doubt. I offer an analogy between illness and Husserl’s epoché, suggesting that both are a source of distancing, and therefore motivate a reflective stance.

Highlights

Illness is a profound and life-changing event
I claim that studying cases of pathology, breakdown, and illness offer illumination of these experiences, and of normal function and the tacit background that underpins it
I offer an analogy between illness and Husserl’s epoché, suggesting that both are a source of distancing, and motivate a reflective stance

Summary

Introduction

Illness is a profound and life-changing event. Falling ill or receiving a diagnosis of a serious illness requires the ill person, and those around her, to stop and take stock of life as it has been and as it may be on.[1]. I claim that the study of embodiment can be greatly enhanced, and would be incomplete, without examining bodily breakdown and what I term “bodily doubt.” In these two ways—the distancing that illness causes and the insights we may glean from illness experiences—illness offers a philosophical method proper. I suggest that the study of pathology, whether of body or of mind, can form the basis of a phenomenological method. Illness distances the ill person from previous bodily and life habits and their accompanying tacit assumptions This gives me reason to suggest that illness. What I do argue is that there is a profound break between the two types of state so pathological states are not merely amplified or quantitatively more extreme versions of normal states, but of a different kind altogether and worthy of independent and thorough philosophical investigation

Illness as existential change

Illness as epoché

Pathology illuminating normalcy