Abstract
We consider a behavioral model of voting in multi-candidate elections under plurality rule. In the case of a positive impression of the campaign leader, voters increase their propensity to vote for that candidate, while in the case of a negative impression voters decrease their propensity. The formation of positive or negative impressions depends on an endogenous aspiration level. We show that in multi-candidate elections, in any stationary distribution, the winner receives a share of 50% of votes. Our results suggest that achieving coordination is ‘path-dependent’: whether voters manage to coordinate on the majority-preferred candidate critically depends on the initial state. We then identify conditions that make the election of the majority-preferred candidate more likely. However, even if the majority candidate is elected for sure, voting behavior is only partially coordinated.
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