Abstract
Patent sharks (a.k.a. patent trolls) appropriate innovation rents by threatening to patent-block other players' R&D-related value creation. Modelling interactions between sharks and manufacturers within a biform game, we show that, despite policy changes, patent extortion will remain viable. We support our findings using empirical data on patent shark attacks.
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