Abstract
In a cloud service supply chain composed of a cloud application developer (CAD) and two heterogeneous cloud service providers (CSPs), we study the cooperative supply decision making of the basic service unit. First, the optimization problem is modeled as a “patent labeling” game, where the labeling and supplying strategies of CAD are analyzed under different confidence indexes. Second, due to the immeasurability of the confidence index, the Shapley value contract is used to split profits at the cooperative stage, and the decision rule of CAD is presented. Finally, a cooperative subsidy mechanism is further proposed to achieve the Pareto improvement of all players when compared with the wholesale price contract. Model analysis shows that whether CAD is extremely optimistic or pessimistic in the negotiation with CSPs, it chooses to cooperate with the well-known CSP. Labeling is only selected when CAD is extremely pessimistic, and the labeling cost is low. When the confidence index fails to reach the extreme values, the supplier can make decisions referring to the hybrid contract on the basis of the Shapley value and cooperative subsidy mechanism.
Highlights
In recent years, the development of network and low carbon economies has driven cloud computing service to become the fastest-growing market
We prove that our mixed contract of the Shapley value and cooperative subsidy mechanism can realize the Pareto improvement when compared with the wholesale price contract
We propose a coopetition game model for patent labeling and cooperation in a cloud service supply chain, which consists of one cloud application developer (CAD) and two cloud service providers (CSPs)
Summary
The development of network and low carbon economies has driven cloud computing service to become the fastest-growing market. We propose a coopetition game model for patent labeling and cooperation in a cloud service supply chain, which consists of one CAD and two CSPs. Compared with existing research, this study achieves the following key contributions. The total revenue function of the cloud supply chain is πB = apB−bBp2B if CAD-I decides to provide the basic service unit to CSP-B. The total revenue function of the cloud supply chain is πB = −(bB/η)p2B + (a + bBc0/η) pB − ac0 if CAD-I decides to provide the basic service unit to CSP-B. CSP-B is indirectly involved in the cloud application operation and service, CSP-B receives a profit share from the supply chain because of the Shapley value contract. The revenue share allocated for CSP-B under the Shapley value contract can be regarded as an incentive cost
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