Passing, Traveling and Reality: Social Constructionism and the Metaphysics of Race

Abstract

Among race theorists, view race is a social construction is widespread. While term 'social construction' is sometimes intended to mean merely race does not (as once believed) constitute a robust, biological natural kind, it often labels stronger position race is real, but not a biological kind. For example, Charles Mills (1998) writes that, the task of those working on race is to put race in quotes, 'race', while still insisting nevertheless, it exists (and moves people)(xiv, italics his). It is to make a plausible social ontology neither essentialist, innate, nor transhistorical, but real enough for all that (xiv). Racial constructionism, thus conceived, is a metaphysical position contrasts both with view race is an important biological kind (racial naturalism) and with more recent claim race does not exist (racial skepticism). The desire for a constructionist metaphysics of race emerges against background of a cluster of normative disputes, including: