Abstract
This paper analyzes the determinants of legislative voting with a single case study using a probit statistical model. Resolution 125/2008 – born as an executive decree and later submitted to the National Congress – became the first rejected project during both Mr. and Ms. Kirchner administrations. The hypothesis on the primacy of party discipline is tested taking into account the political party affiliation along with variables such as provincial fiscal balances, provincial agrarian situation and end date of legislative terms. After describing the Argentine political system, the paper develops a formal approach and test the argument via a probit statistical model. The conclusion is that party affiliation is the strongest explanatory variable for legislator behavior, except where the possibility of electoral punishment interacts with both political action leeway and political ambition – particularly when the latter strives for a greater elective office.
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