Party controls in National Central University and Nanjing University before and after 1949

Reviewed by: Religion and Nationalism in Chinese Societies ed. by Cheng-Tian Kuo Jonathan Brasnett Cheng-tian Kuo, ed., Religion and Nationalism in Chinese Societies. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press B.V., 2017. 425 pp. €109 (hb) ISBN 978-94-6298-439-4 Religion and Nationalism in Chinese Societies is an impressive volume that aims to explore the evolution of religion-state relations, the influence of religion in nationalist discourse and the phenomenon of nationalism as a quasi-religion in the “Greater China” region (i.e., China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong). Kuo’s introduction lays out the competing theories of modernism, which sees religion as having no place in the modern Chinese polities, and revisionism, which holds that religion and politics have influenced one another throughout Chinese dynastic history and that this has continued into modern China, with nationalism replacing religion as the primary tool for strengthening the legitimacy of the rulers. He summarizes the current context in contemporary “Greater China,” arguing that the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or mainland China) mobilizes a “political Trinity: patriotism, socialism, and the rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)” with all other religions subservient (p. 13); in the Republic of China (ROC, or Taiwan), religions enjoy both freedom of worship and freedom to influence politics; in Hong Kong, a “civil religion” is developing which defends democratic values but remains fragile (p. 14). Part I of the volume examines the nexus between Chinese religion and nationalism before the foundation of the PRC in 1949. Chapter 2, by Chi-shen Chang, explores the different form of “Chineseness” or Chinese identity, which form the basis of modern Chinese nationalism. This “Chineseness” could have a political-geographic connotation, based on the territory historically controlled by Chinese rulers; it could have a cultural connotation, based on sharing a common “language, costumes, customs, and values” (p. 62); or it could have an ethnic connotation based on common Han ethnicity descended from the mythical Yellow Emperor. Chang cites Wang Fuzhi 王夫之, the seventeenth-century Chinese philosopher, who argued that Chinese identity was based on the Confucian ideal of defending the Chinese territory, culture and ethnicity from barbarian invasions, which remains a key aspect of “Chineseness” to this day. [End Page 101] The third chapter, by Julia C. Schneider, examines the ways in which China sought to assimilate or “sinicize” those living within its territory who did not share the same Chinese linguistic, cultural, ethnic or even national identity. Applying Liang Qichao’s 梁啟超 concept of “lesser nationalism,” which regards those who are not ethnically Han residing inside the Chinese territory as inferior, she argues that the Ming and Qing dynasties undertook “Confucian civilizing” missions to assimilate other ethnic groups to the dominant Han culture. Likening this practice to Christian missionizing, Schneider insists that the Han Chinese perceived their Confucian values and culture as supreme, thereby justifying expansionism and sinicization during the Ming and Qing dynasties, which continues to inspire Chinese nationalism today. The fourth chapter, by Adam Yuet Chau, discusses different “spheres” (jie 界) that formed in Chinese society as it modernized in the early 20th century, each advocating on behalf of different interest groups, including the scholarly sphere, the minorities sphere, the political sphere, and the religion sphere. These spheres, in theory, should complement each other in a functioning modern state, but during the Maoist era of the PRC, many of them, including religion, were deprived of their autonomy and co-opted by the CCP to serve as “instruments in the state’s effort to mobilize society for building socialism” (p. 132). Chau argues that, in an effort to ensure that the religion sector could never be influenced by foreign interests, the CCP encouraged the creation of representational bodies for each religion which are amenable to state control, fostering greater Chinese nationalism among actors in the state-sanctioned religion sphere. Chapter 5, by Robert D. Weatherly and Qiang Zhang, outlines two different types of nationalism employed by the CCP, and gives an example of each type. First, confrontational nationalism emphasizes one’s victimization at the hands of an “enemy” by focusing on a symbolic injustice. The CCP has used this approach by often highlighting the Yuanmingyuan incident (1860), in...

The early relationship between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Kuomintang (KMT) is regarded as an important issue in contemporary Chinese history, but the explanation of this phenomenon has differed for a long time. There is a major dispute in controversy in interpretations of this event. Some hold that the KMT ”accommodated Communists,” and the CCP insists that the Communists ”allied with the KMT,” The CCP realized that allying with the KMT was the correct choice at the time, and it was also in accordance with the Marxist-Leninist revolution strategy. Why dose the CCP say so? And what is the truth? This essay, from the perspective of the history of the Chinese Communist movement, attempts to understand what the CCP means by the ”historical conditions of the time?” Why was cooperation with the KMT the right historical choice? Is it possible or not to say, from the point of view of the CCP, that joining the KMT was ”the only choice?” In the 1920's, both parties were facing the difficulties of social mobilization, and there also existed the complementary interaction for revolutionary identification. In fact, the CCP leaders of that time clearly recognized that the only method which Dr. Sun Yet-sen would accept was that Communists could join the KMT as individuals, instead of as a group under the name of the CCP. On the other hand, because the Comintern was supporting both the CCP and the KMT, if the CCP did not join the KMT, the Comintern might have had to choose between the two parties. Since the danger of losing the support of the Comintern was much greater than that of joining the KMT, we may say that for the CCP, joining the KMT was in fact the one and only choice they had at the time.

Reviewed by: Mao's Generals: Chen Yi and the New Fourth Army Peter O. Hefron (bio) Lanxin Xiang . Mao's Generals: Chen Yi and the New Fourth Army. Lanham, New York, and Oxford: University Press of America, 1998. xi, 223 pp. Hardcover $37.50, ISBN 0-7618-1129-x. Lanxin Xiang, Professor of International History at Geneva's Graduate Institute of International Studies, has written a well-researched work that is part biography of Chen Yi and part military history of the Chinese Communist Revolution. It traces Chen Yi's career from radical student to founder and commander of the New Fourth Army (NFA). It is also a military history of the NFA, dealing especially with its pivotal role in destroying the main power base of the Guomindang (GMD) in central and eastern China during the 1947-1949 period. One of the book's strengths is Xiang's use of his interviews with surviving members of the NFA as well as his utilization of newly published primary sources, mainly from the People's Republic of China (PRC). The history of the Eighth Route Army, created by the veterans of the Long March, is well known. Xiang provides us with an in-depth look at what happened to those scattered Chinese Communist Party (CCP) guerrilla units in Southeast China that the CCP Central Committee left behind at the start of the Long March. From these units and their commanders arose the New Fourth Army. He traces the evolution and unification of these units during their three years of isolation from Mao Zedong's Yan'an headquarters. Communications were reestablished in late 1937, parallel to the creation of the second CCP-GMD United Front. From the surviving thirteen thousand "Red Bandits," Mao in Yan'an, Chen Yi and his guerrilla cohorts in southern China, and the Guomindang fashioned the New Fourth Army from October to December 1937. Xiang gives a detailed analysis of the chief battles of the NFA as well as of the controversies between Mao and the NFA leadership over correct military and political strategy. The NFA soon became a microcosm for the factional rivalry between Mao's real and imagined enemies within the CCP, ranging from the pro Stalinist Comintern group to potential rightists among CCP military officers. The NFA ostensibly harbored both varieties. The NFA also served as the arena for strategic debates between Mao and the NFA's leadership, soon personified by Chen Yi and a number of his generals such as Su Yu, Ye Fei, and Huang Kechang. At issue were three matters: Should the CCP continue to rely on Mao's guerrilla warfare strategy or escalate permanently to conventional mobile warfare using regular CCP troop units? By 1947, mobile warfare was favored and successfully practiced by the NFA. To do otherwise, Chen felt, would extend the civil war by allowing the GMD to dominate the battlefield. [End Page 248] Should the NFA follow Mao's periodic desire to rebuild the CCP guerrilla bases south of the Yangzi River or follow Chen's strategy of taking the revolution to the GMD's strategic heartland north of the Yangzi River? Xiang discusses this seesaw debate in detail. Finally, should the CCP's chief goal for the second CCP-GMD United Front be to fight the Japanese invaders or to use it as cover for the CCP to expand its territory, troops, and population at the expense of the GMD? Unlike the other two issues, this latter debate was easily won by Mao. Soon most of the NFA leadership accepted Mao's view that the anti-Japanese war was secondary. CCP expansion, even at the risk of restarting the civil war, was necessary if Mao was to defeat the GMD government after the Western Allies defeated Japan. Xiang includes an analysis of Mao's pre-1949 purges of his CCP opponents, most notably the anti-Bolshevik purge of the early 1930s and the 1942 rectification of both Rightists and Cominternists. Mao's egocentric determination to become "China's Stalin" through periodic purges, regardless of their impact on the revolution, is a forerunner of post-1949 Maoist excesses. Inevitably these issues focus the author's attention on the credibility...

A year after the sudden ending of the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), the second stage of the Chinese Civil War began and ended in 1949 with the victory of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). There is heated debate on the cause of the Nationalists’ defeat: Was it the CCP’s strengths or the Guomindang (GMD)’s weaknesses? The outcome of the war was ultimately an interplay between the GMD’s weaknesses and the CCP’s strengths. The GMD made serious tactical errors in areas where the CCP was strong, which exacerbated the GMD’s deficiencies, and bolstered the CCP’s status as a viable alternative. In terms of both popular support and military successes, the GMD fell short, which was in stark contrast to the CCP’s immense gains. This essay demonstrates how, first of all, the Nationalists lost the support of key social groups while the Communists won their support through the attraction of their ideology and the promise of socioeconomic reforms. Second, the GMD made errors that deeply weakened their military strategy while the CCP embraced mobile warfare. In the end, the GMD’s failures were not enough to lead to their defeat, nor did the CCP’s strengths alone cause their success.

The communist revolution of China was led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which was founded in 1921 in the wake of the May Fourth movement. The CCP began as a very small Marxist‐inspired left‐wing intellectual club, with little political influence prior to its alliance with the Chinese Nationalist Party (GMD) in 1924. The GMD were motivated to ally with the CCP in order to obtain support from the Soviet Union in their fight with the northern warlords. With the help of the CCP, the GMD was remodeled from a loose organization into a Leninist party, and the GMD also received financial and other support from the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the CCP also developed quickly by infiltrating the GMD‐controlled army and by expanding its organizations in the urban and rural areas of southern China. While the alliance between the GMD and CCP brought great success for both parties, tensions also grew as the parties pursued different agendas. After the initial military success against the warlords during the Northern Expedition, a growing number of the GMD's leaders and generals became very unhappy about the CCP's infiltration into the GMD‐controlled army as well as about the CCP's radical property redistribution policy, which was implemented in the territories recently occupied by the GMD's Northern Expedition army. As a result they no longer wanted to share power with the CCP. In early 1927, shortly after Northern Expedition troops occupied Shanghai, the GMD started to purge the CCP‐controlled organizations in the city and labeled the CCP an illegal organization. The purge soon spread, with hundreds of thousands of CCP members and their sympathizers arrested and killed. In response, the CCP staged several military uprisings in late 1927 in places where they had strong influence. While all these uprisings were easily suppressed by the GMD army, the surviving members of the CCP were able to retreat to mountain areas and conduct guerrilla warfare.

The communist revolution of China was led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which was founded in 1921 in the wake of the May Fourth movement. The CCP began as a very small Marxist‐inspired left‐wing intellectual club, with little political influence prior to its alliance with the Chinese Nationalist Party (GMD) in 1924. The GMD were motivated to ally with the CCP in order to obtain support from the Soviet Union in their fight with the northern warlords. With the help of the CCP, the GMD was remodeled from a loose organization into a Leninist party, and the GMD also received financial and other support from the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the CCP also developed quickly by infiltrating the GMD‐controlled army and by expanding its organizations in the urban and rural areas of southern China. While the alliance between the GMD and CCP brought great success for both parties, tensions also grew as the parties pursued different agendas. After the initial military success against the warlords during the Northern Expedition, a growing number of the GMD's leaders and generals became very unhappy about the CCP's infiltration into the GMD‐controlled army as well as about the CCP's radical property redistribution policy, which was implemented in the territories recently occupied by the GMD's Northern Expedition army. As a result they no longer wanted to share the power with the CCP. In early 1927, shortly after Northern Expedition troops occupied Shanghai, the GMD started to purge the CCP‐controlled organizations in the city and labeled the CCP an illegal organization. The purge soon spread, with hundreds of thousands of CCP members and their sympathizers arrested and killed. In response, the CCP staged several military uprisings in late 1927 in places where they had strong influence. While all these uprisings were easily suppressed by the GMD army, the surviving members of the CCP were able to retreat to mountain areas and conduct guerrilla warfare.

Like Regime, Like Newspaper: Comparative Analysis on Newspaper Industries across Taiwan Strait (1949-1958) Abstract Ever since 1949, across Taiwan strait, the Republic of China on Taiwan ruled by Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuo Min Tang, KMT) and the People’s Republic of China on Chinese Mainland ruled by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) were antagonist to each other for a long time. Far-reaching changes were mandated both in Taiwan and Mainland China by the two regimes while communications between people on both sides of Taiwan strait were banned, and later vanished. Thus, to all professions across Taiwan strait, two groups of numerous experiments were performed at the same time. The experiences and consequences of these experiments influenced the working conditions, lives and cultures on both territories and evidenced distinction between the two national systems. As the most important media at the time, newspaper industry was highly regarded by both KMT and CCP. Although in the beginning of the political separation, newspaper industries across Taiwan strait were quite similar, the many newspaper policies raised by the two governments molded different environments for the industry. Experiments of newspaper industry under different regimes were taken place from then on. Within ten years, the newspaper industries evolved seperately across the strait, and around 1958, divergent newspaper systems appeared. Newspaper industry in Mainland China became a typical example of the industry under totalitarian regime, while newspaper industry in Taiwan showed itself a model of the industry under authoritarian regime. Base on the above historical background, what was the mechanism that caused and shaped different newspaper industries across Taiwan strait? How did newspaper industry respond to totalitarian or authoritarian ruling? What factors that differentiated authoritarianism from totalitarianism can be reached through the examples in newspaper industry? These questions reckon the necessity of comparative study on the same industry in two isolated and widely different regions during the same time period. This dissertation tries to be contributive to the answers. Newspaper industry is considered and studied here with its entire functionality. Not only are news reporting, editing and editorial writing examined, but newspaper’s producing, sales and management are also studied. Comparative historical analysis is applied as the main methodology with the assistance of knowledges from journalism, political science, sociology, business administration and accounting. Acknowledging newapapers as the “tongue and throat to the party” and tool for propaganda, CCP spared no effort to control newspaper industry. However, it’s means and artifices were nimble and flexible. From 1949, CCP elaborated a government-owned hierarchy newspaper system. Party leaders directed newspapers owned and operated by central to local governments, while tolerated temporary existence of some privately-owned newspapers. Following the establishment of the regime, CCP seized newspaper industry’s resources such as manpower, materials, financial supply, news announcing, circulation channels and market throughout Mainland China. The number of remaining privately-owned newspapers and circulation and advertising agent houses declined sharply and eventually died out in a few years. When CCP had monopolized the newspaper industry, consequently, it had monopolized the social capitals contained in the industry. Newspapers in the totalitarian country became part of the regime itself. On the other side of the strait, the retreating and exhausted KMT faced difficulties inside and outside Taiwan. For surviving, the adoption of a two-handed policy, with both suppressions and compromises was inevitable, which made the ROC of Taiwan an authoritarian country. Government’s publication moratorium and journalistic taboos set walls around newspaper industry, but also kept potential competitors away. Among the coexisting, fixed-numbered newspapers, those owned by government or KMT were in leading positions in 1949. However, due to the realism of authoritarianism, some “reservations,” such as social and crime news, popular supply and circulation markets, and advertisements had been made by the government for other newspapers to maneuver their future with free competition in these areas. Privately-owned newspapers utilized the opportunities created by these “reservations” to compete capitalistically. In ten years, resources contained in Taiwanese societies were gradually excavated and transferred to privately-owned newspapers when social capitals were being accumulated by them; meanwhile government- and KMT-owned newspapers began to ebb. Preparation for privately-owned newspapers to meet the further economic development and foundation for them to exceed government- and KMT-owned newspapers were established in this period of time. Ten years were short in history, yet long enough to create two completely different newspaper industries in two areas that were politically separated and isolated to each other. It was the decade right after the split in 1949 that the two regimes across Taiwan strait, CCP’s totalitarian and KMT’s authoritarian, formed newspaper industries based on each one’s political ideology. So ten years are long enough to have a specific newspaper industry appear under a regime’s specific ruling. Sensitive to its environment as any other news media is, newspaper industry is a product of the regime that brings about the media industry’s environment. Like regime, like newspaper.

Research Article| August 01 1990 The Structure of Communist Party Control in Hong Kong John P. Burns John P. Burns Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Asian Survey (1990) 30 (8): 748–765. https://doi.org/10.2307/2644496 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation John P. Burns; The Structure of Communist Party Control in Hong Kong. Asian Survey 1 August 1990; 30 (8): 748–765. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2644496 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu nav search search input Search input auto suggest search filter All ContentAsian Survey Search This content is only available via PDF. Copyright 1990 The Regents of the University of California Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

In the mid-1920s, most of the Chinese political parties founded during the early years of the Republic disappeared from the political circles. There remained only two parties that became the decisive forces to the destiny of the country—the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Kuomintang (KMT) after its reshuffle. In 1927, the cooperation between the CCP and the KMT broke down. Chiang Kai-shek brought a policy of slaughter and armed-suppression to the CCP. To contend against the KMT, the Chinese Communists were forced to shift their bases to the countryside and mountain areas. Since then, the prolonged life-and-death struggle between the two political parties emerged in China. Against the background of this division of Chinese politics into two opposing parties, the Third Party came into being.1

The Ultimate Social Network: China's Expansionary, Internationally Oriented United Front Strategies 1923-2020

This chapter covers the period from the decline of the Chinese empire beginning in the early decades of the nineteenth century to the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. It discusses failed efforts to save the imperial system by the Qing dynasty, the 1911 Republican Revolution and its aftermath, the fragile republic that emerged in the aftermath of that revolution, the consolidation of power in the Republic by Chiang Kai-shek and his Kuomintang (KMT) party, the rise of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Mao Zedong as its unchallenged leader, the brutal invasion and occupation of China by Japan, the civil war between the CCP and the KMT, and the victory of the communists in that conflict.

For both the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Guomindang (GMD), the experience of their political association from 1922 to 1927 had a profound effect on the later course of their development. This period has come to be known as the First United Front, though in fact this term cannot be used without initial reservation, since only the CCP spoke of a united front between it and the GMD. For the latter party, with its well-established revolutionary history, the term “admission of the communists” (rong gong) was invariably used to denote the opening up of GMD membership to members of a smaller and definitely junior political movement. The adoption of the communist designation in later years by many students of the period reflects in part the attention given by western scholarship to the development of the CCP during the critical years of the 1920s. However, even if the term “united front” is retained for convenience as a general rubric for the 1922–27 period, it is important that the Guomindang be subjected to careful scrutiny in its own right, so that the GMD-CCP relationship may be understood more fully. This is to be stressed, since the categories often applied to the GMD, such as “left” and “right,” while of value in some instances, on the whole blur or distort the wide range of opinion within that party on the question of communist involvement in it. Until the purge of the CCP took place in 1927, GMD attitudes towards the communists were characterized by much fluidity.

本文主要討論1919-1927年之間蔣中正革命道路的起源和形成過程。蔣中正革命道路主要源自共產國際殖民地民族革命的策略和戴季陶對於中國革命的詮釋。1925年孫中山過世之後，戴季陶提出國民黨革命道路的理論，尤其以生產力優先的主張反對中共的階級鬥爭策略。戴季陶與中共各擷取、運用不同部分的馬克思主義，以作為其不同革命道路的理論來源，並相互批評、攻擊。蔣中正一方面公開支持聯俄容共，另一方面則依據戴季陶的理論發展不同於中共的革命道路，即重視軍事行動和道德改變，以發展中國生產力為優先，反對中國社會內部的階級鬥爭。在戴季陶發表其革命理論之後，蔣中正逐漸在其公開演講和著作中提出與戴季陶相同的觀點，終在1926年5月底之後被中共和共產國際視為戴季陶思想的執行者。蔣中正與中共兩條革命道路的分歧，在共產國際所推行的「國共合作」政策下加深，最終演至相互衝突、對抗。蔣中正的革命道路呈現其改造中國的獨特方式，是共產國際殖民地民族革命全球戰略的一部分。然而，這一革命道路逐漸發展為對抗中共的政治力量。對於中共而言，蔣中正的革命實具備著「反革命」的性質。因此，蔣中正革命道路應界定為革命抑或反革命的兩全或兩難，實則反映了「中國革命」的悲劇性，以及中國與現代世界的複雜關係。

Studies on the Chinese Nationalist Party, the Zhongguo Guomindang (GMD), have focused on some fundamental questions. The first has concerned its political and ideological roots. The GMD was built in 1912 when Sun Yat-sen directed the transformation of the Tongmenghui into a centralized, democratic political party. In 1913, however, the ex-Qing minister and general, Yuan Shikai, became the president of the Republic of China and ordered the dissolution of the GMD. In 1919 the GMD was revived by Sun, but only in 1923 did the party reaffirm its role. In the early Republic, the GMD developed in a political culture in which factions and personal connections were fundamental, causing large disagreement about its policy and ideology. In the early 1920s, Comintern representatives helped to reorganize the GMD in a Leninist-style party, setting basic approaches for bilateral cooperation, to include the recently established Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The GMD was restructured and a modern military force was created. The party’s ideology was, on the contrary, rather homegrown: the Three People’s Principles were elaborated into a political platform that targeted warlordism and imperialism. From 1926 on, the Guomindang, with the support of the Soviet advisers and the CCP, brought the warlord era to an end and, to a great extent, unified China; after Sun’s death in 1925, Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi) rose to national power. The second area of investigation has concerned GMD’s performance in state building and governance. In 1928, after the end the Northern Expedition and the GMD-CCP split, Chiang and the GMD established a national government in Nanjing, which lasted about ten years (1928–1937, the so-called Nanjing decade), before the start of China’s war of resistance against Japan. The war years (1937–1945) saw the GMD-CCP United Front, which was largely ineffective; the relocation of the capital to Chongqing; and the birth of a collaborationist government headed by Wang Jingwei. In the late 1940s, a final battle between the GMD and the CCP resulted in the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 and in the retreat of the Guomindang to Taiwan. Scholars have debated on the GMD’s capacity, arguing either that the modest but definite successes in unification and a variety of modernization projects would in the long run have produced a stable and prosperous country, had not the Japanese invaded China, or, on the contrary, emphasizing how GMD regime’s authoritarianism, corruption, and incompetence as well as Chiang’s policy produced a demoralizing effect on the party and a growing dissatisfaction within society. For many decades, studies on the GMD have been informed by the Cold War–era divisions and the basic orientations of Chinese historiography during the Maoist period. Recently new trends have emerged offering deeper insights into several questions, which include a more reliable evaluation of Chiang Kai-shek’s role.

The development and change of wartime higher education significantly impacted China's modern history, and its evolution was closely related to the advocacies and ideas of Chen Lifu, who served as the Minister of Education from 1938 to 1944. This paper first analyzes the merger and relocation of universities with examples such as the Southwest United Nations University and the National Central University, arguing that relocations ensured the continuity and development of higher education in China and nurtured many professional talents. The paper also focuses on the loan and publicly-funded student system, which Chen Lifu adopted mainly to compete for the youth with the Communist Party and the Japanese forces. The system helped a large number of economically disadvantaged students to complete their studies, enhanced young students' sense of responsibility towards the country, stabilized society, and increased the public's trust in the government. Besides, the paper analyzes the military recruitment of young people, briefly describes the recruitment of medical, engineering, and translation students, the peak of military recruitment, and the participation of young expeditionary force in the war, as well as the critical role of these recruitments in the victory of the war.