Abstract
A wave of plebiscitary reforms has swept the German states in the past decade. This study uses explanations for cartel party failure as a starting point for investigating why the biggest German parties defected from their long-held consensus against direct democracy. The article shows that, in an increasingly competitive electoral environment, parties were willing to sacrifice long-term benefits in hopes of making short-term electoral gains. More generally, it suggests that the course of institutional reform cannot be understood merely by looking at distributions of party interests and voter preferences. Instead, it is also necessary to examine why political actors come to see their interests in a different light.
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