Party Competence Evaluations and Voting for Congress

Abstract

Q NE of the most intriguing regularities in American elections is the loss of seats in the House of Representatives by the President's party in midterm elections. With but a single significant exception, the inparty has lost seats in every midterm since the two-party system was established in the last century. This regular pattern has naturally spawned a considerable volume of research (Campbell 1966; Hinckley 1967; Tufte 1975; Kernell 1977; Abramowitz et al. 1983). Broadly speaking, two explanations have been offered for the recurring loss of support for the inparty in midterm elections. First, there are what might be called the theories. In these theories the inparty's congressional delegation is the unintended victim of electoral tides. The earliest and best known of these mechanical theories is Campbell's notion of an almost inevitable decline of support for the inparty after a presidential year surge (1966). The on-year (or presidential year) surge is largely attributed to who flock to support the party of the winning presidential candidate as short-term forces sweep through the electorate. The midterm decline is explained by Campbell as the moreor-less inevitable result of a move back toward partisan balance as these peripheral voters fail to participate as faithfully in midterms elections as they do in more salient presidential elections. To a large extent Campbell's theory has escaped serious empirical analysis, but recent literature pointing out the declining significance of presidential coattails casts doubt on this and other mechanical theories (Calvert and Ferejohn 1984). The second explanation for inparty midterm losses involves the notion that the punishment of the President's party is no accident but is rather the product of deliberate decisions by the electorate. From this perspective midterms are a referendum on the incumbent administration. As a rule