Abstract
During this century, the electoral fortunes of members of Congress have become less a function of party affiliation, and more a function of personal relationships with their constituencies. With the Campaign Finance Reform Act of 1996, House Republican leaders sought to reinvigorate the role of the national parties in financing congressional campaigns. Guided by Conditional Party Government theory, we explore reasons a member of Congress might have for supporting such legislation. We find that a member's likelihood of supporting this party-strengthening bill is highly sensitive to his or her ideological distance to the right or left of the party leadership.
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