Partners in crime: Convenience case study of Norwegian publishing cartel

Abstract

The theory of convenience addresses white-collar and corporate crime. The theory is applied in this article to a case study of Norwegian publishing houses having to pay infringement fees because of competition act violation. Cartel members agreed and coordinated a boycott of a distribution channel. This article reviews the research literature on cartels before presenting the convenience case study. Combatting cartels is a matter of reducing the attractiveness and convenience of joining cartels. Guardianship, oversight, and controls are at the core of reducing deviance convenience. Detection is an element of oversight. However, detection is rare, as this case illustrated by email sent by mistake. Combatting cartels is a matter of control at the top of organizations where typically each chief executive officer (CEO) is involved. Therefore, the corporate compliance officer should never report to the CEO but rather to the chairperson on the board and to the external auditor.