PARTISANSHIP AND THE PURSE: THE MONEY COMMITTEES AND PROCEDURES IN THE POST‐REFORM CONGRESS

Abstract

We analyze floor decision making on taxing and spending legislation during the 96th, 100th, and 104th Congresses in order to assess how electoral forces, fiscal pressures, and institutional change have affected the role of the money committees. Examination of decision making on legislation from these committees provides insight into how different committees and different institutions responded to this volatile post‐reform environment. We find that partisanship on floor decision making increased considerably over time across committee legislation in both chambers. Still, partisan conflict tended to be greater on taxing legislation than on appropriating legislation. This reflects the differential impact of partisanship across the different types of policies under the jurisdiction of the money committees. By the 104th, patterns of differences were particularly pronounced across committees, rather than across chambers, suggesting the common exogenous forces at work affecting both institutions similarly. In addition, we find that members adapted procedural devices in both chambers for partisan purposes in order to limit amending activity on legislation from the money committees. Together, these changes reflect both the dramatically altered decision making process and the increasing tendency toward a party‐dominated role for the money committees.