Abstract
This note examines the distributive calculus of the Australian Labor government in apportioning millions of dollars of constituency-level grants in the weeks preceding the 1990 and 1993 Australian federal elections. While parliamentary systems have long been assumed to stymie constituency-level electoral effects-given their foundation on party government, caucus discipline, and voter loyalties directed to parties, not candidates-they also create a collective incentive for the party in government to pursue victories in its most marginal seats, including the tactical apportioning of discretionary funds. The results confirm a distinctly parliamentary form of distributive politics dominated by partisan and marginal seats priorities, while the decision-making influence of cabinet members appears sufficient to secure them funds disproportionate to their marginality.
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