Partisan Justification and Religious Belief

Abstract

Abstract Weak conciliationism affirms that many of one’s epistemic starting points enjoy “partisan justification,” justified confidence that exceeds the degree of confidence that is supportable on impartial grounds. But weak conciliationism does not itself supply an account that says when such partisan justification is and is not available. This chapter begins by identifying the options for an account of partisan justification. It then argues for an exclusively rationalist account according to which partisan justification is grounded in rational insight and is not available in disagreements with acknowledged internal rational parity. This argument presents a challenge for “reformed epistemologists,” like Alston and Plantinga, who deemphasize the role of rational insight in religious belief and who defend religious belief by emphasizing similarities between religious belief formation and the formation of perceptual beliefs. It is argued that the religious epistemologies of Alston and Plantinga cannot successfully meet the higher-order challenge posed by religious disagreement.