Partisan and professional control: Predictors of bureaucratic tenure in Germany

Abstract

This paper analyses the patterns of bureaucratic tenure of the German federal bureaucratic elite. It applies a delegation theory and a Public Service Bargain perspective and argues that partisan and professional determinants influence the bureaucratic tenure. Our survival analysis shows that partisan features matter, yet differently than suggested by existing research: top officials affiliated with the minister’s party have a significant higher risk of dismissal than those affiliated to other parties and non-partisans. In contrast, the temporal proximity between ministerial and top official appointments has no significant effects on bureaucratic tenure. In addition, professional determinants shape bureaucratic survival. Whereas the minister’s office experience is insignificant for bureaucratic survival, the top official’s office experience has significant and negative effects on the risk of dismissal: individuals with prior experience in managing bureaucratic apparatuses survive longer than those without such office experience. We conclude that German ministers are more likely to dismiss senior civil servants due to their unsatisfying office experience than their incongruent or lacking partisan affiliation.