Parties’ foreign policy approach and the outcome of coalition allocation negotiations: the case of Israel

Abstract

Foreign policy research has explored the impacts of different aspects of domestic politics on actors’ international behavior. This work looks in the other direction, examining how political parties’ foreign policy approach affects the share of payoffs they successfully negotiate in parliamentary government coalitions. This study integrates political psychology research, correlating IR paradigms and negotiating behavior, with studies of coalition formation. The article also expands on previous coalition allocation research through analysis of ministers, deputy ministers, and committee chairs in eight coalition governments in Israel from 1992 to 2015. The results indicate that political parties characterized by a realist approach obtain a higher share of coalition payoffs, quantitative and qualitative, than parties with a constructivist or liberal approach. Realists’ advantage is revealed to be significantly greater among non-formateur parties. This work contributes to research on coalition allocation, political behavior, political parties, and foreign policy analysis.