Particulars, Practices, and Pragmatic Feminism: Breaking Rules and Rulings with William James

Abstract

Particulars, Practices, and Pragmatic Feminism: Breaking Rules and Rulings with William James Erin C. Tarver In point of fact, there are no absolute evils, and there are no non-moral goods; and the highest ethical life—however few may be called to bear its burdens—consists at all times in the breaking of rules which have grown too narrow for the actual case. —William James, The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life A recent conversation I had with a fellow philosopher turned on the question of particulars: Is it ever true that our theorizing is separable from the everyday lives and experiences of “real” people outside the academy? Are ideas things we can try on or toss aside without consequence, like so many frivolous hats? I was inclined, as a feminist, to answer both of these questions with an emphatic no. Committed to the idea that theories are always politically loaded—in both their origins and their consequences—I could not agree that my work as a philosopher should or could be divorced from the lived realities of people on the ground. Though it is obviously true that not everyone philosophizes (professionally or otherwise), it does not follow that those of us who do are thereby excused from thinking through the particular practical effects of this or that conception of truth, reality, or goodness on the lives of actual individuals in the world. A philosophy that refuses to concern itself with the messy particulars of existence is both deluded and dangerous. Although feminists may very frequently find themselves in just such confrontations with a philosophical establishment that cannot or will not recognize questions about the particulars of women’s lives as legitimate roads of inquiry, there are a few allies within the philosophical camp (and thankfully, of late their numbers are steadily growing). My purpose in this article is to show where and how William James’s pragmatism is theoretically useful for feminists, especially those feminists in dialogue with traditional philosophy. My investigation of James’s work will be topically organized by attention to three conceptual themes, [End Page 275] which, though interrelated in James’s thought, I will distinguish for the purposes of clarity: the concept of habit, the notion of the pluralism of experience (which I will treat in conjunction with selective attention and the constructed nature of truth), and the importance of consequences for the evaluation of philosophical commitments. Putting these theoretical resources to work in the service of feminism, I will argue that James’s thought is rich in resources for articulating the continued pervasiveness of sexism, especially as that sexism remains nontransparent to those implicated in it; for problematizing the supposedly “essential” nature of gender difference; for emphasizing the situated character of knowledge as constructed and transmitted by differently bodied individuals; and for interrogating the legitimacy of the traditional philosophical separation of theory and practice. Additionally, I will suggest that the relationship between Jamesian pragmatism and feminism need not be unidirectional but that feminist resources may be marshaled to serve as a corrective to James’s own lapses into sexism. However, I will argue that these corrective moments should not result in deep alterations to James’s theoretical framework but, rather, in the claim that James ought to be more consistently pragmatic. Finally, in the spirit of James’s declaration that “pragmatism is uncomfortable away from the facts” (1975, 38), I will, in the final section of this article, analyze a recent ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court that is of particular interest to feminist activists. The majority decision of Ledbetter v. Goodyear, which limits the rights of women to sue employers for sex-based pay discrimination, is centrally dependent on the assumption of the lucidity of two notions: the intent of the employer to discriminate and the isolability of a discrete event of discrimination. I will argue that a feminism informed by Jamesian pragmatism is well equipped to problematize both of these concepts and to expose their theoretical inadequacy as rooted in, among other things, insufficient attention to the relevance of particular social situations. My goal in this article, then, may not easily align with the conventions of typical philosophical or legal discourse...