Particulars: Bare, Naked, and Nude

Abstract

In a footnote in Science, Perception and Reality (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), p. 282 Sellars offers the following as the neatest way in which to expose the absurdity of the notion of bare particulars: The statement Universals are exemplified by bare is self-contradictory as is evident if it is translated into logical notation, viz. (x) [(ap0) (ox) D ( (HO) (qx)]. This translation of the statement Universals are exemplified by bare certainly does reduce it to an absurdity-although the statement cited by Sellars is not a contradiction. For Sellars' translation entails '(x) (2lp) (qx)' and certainly anyone who holds that 'universals are exemplified by bare particulars' countenances the existence of some properties and thus would undoubtedly claim that '(a1x) (HL) (qx)' is true-hence, if Sellars' translation of the claim 'universals are exemplified by bare particulars' is correct, he has exposed the absurdity of bare particulars. A puckish defender of bare particulars is well advised to follow the lead of Sir Kenneth Clark and distinguish between the naked and the nude. Particulars are nude in that they have no, natures, that is, they are not necessarily connected to any specific property or set of properties. A nude particular has no nature, and is to be distinguished from the naked particular which has no properties. Those who claim that there are bare particulars, Russell, Bergmann, Allaire, et al., claim that they are nude of natures, not that they are naked of properties. What Sellars has shown, albeit in a Pickwickian manner, is that the jade who prefers his particulars naked must descend to nominalism (the view that there are no properties-i.e., (x) ' (2[L) (ox) ). But this reduction to nominalism is simply inapplicable to those who prefer their particulars nude. And this becomes evident if we translate the claim universals are