Abstract
Combined electricity-heat operation improves social welfare compared with the traditional heat-driven operation. However, it is left open how to achieve such an improvement in the current electricity market. Therefore, an arbitrage mechanism enabling strategic district heating networks (DHNs) to participate in electricity markets is designed, which settles the payment concerning the power deviation and the locational marginal price (LMP). Individual interests of both energy sectors are addressed via a bi-level model, while analytical results of the arbitrage equilibrium are proved theoretically. Although the mechanism intends to allow DHNs to profit selfishly from utilizing energy storage, it is strikingly guaranteed that electric power networks also benefit from this. A Pareto improvement is thus achieved by the mechanism with enhanced social welfare efficiency at the arbitrage equilibrium. The proposed mechanism is numerically compared with the traditional heat-driven operation, combined operation and existing cooperative and non-cooperative game approaches, while the merits are verified in two integrated electricity and heat systems with different scales.
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