Participation of a Mentally Ill Person in the Commission of a Crime

Abstract

The paper substantiates that the concept of complicity in criminal law requires adjustment: a one-sided subjective connection should be sufficient for complicity. The practice of qualifying acts committed with the participation of menyally ill persons and minors does not fully comply with the principles of criminal law and the objectives of criminal policy. Judicial practice, recognizing the possibility of qualifying the participation in a crime of a mentally ill or minor as a group of persons, has resorted to a broad interpretation of the law. As a result, there are no obstacles to understanding such participation as a group of persons by prior agreement, which, however, is not supported in the current practice. Classification as the actions of the perpetrator of the use of a mentally ill person or a minor in the commission of a crime does not solve the problem, for example, in the case of a crime committed with a special subject recognized as mentally ill. The problem requires a legislative solution. A new definition of complicity is proposed as the intentional participation of a person in the commission of an intentional crime by another person, as well as in the commission of an act prohibited by criminal law, by a person who is not subject to criminal liability due to his age, insanity or other circumstances.