Participation and Existence in the Interpretation of St. Thomas Aquinas

Abstract

PARTICIPATION AND EXISTENCE IN THE INTERPRETATION OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS101 III Having identified the way in which it may be argued that it is genuinely informative to describe Thomism as "existential," it is now possible to try to demonstrate the superiority of a participationist interpretation. It can be shown, I believe, that the participationist motifs unquestionably present in the thought of Aquinas are a more likely source for the metaphysical theory of the actus assendi than is the judgmental knowledge of existence emphasized by Gilson. At least they will seem a more likely source to those who are not convinced of the philosophical, as distinguished from the simply historical, truth of Gilson's thesis. This last point needs to be amplified, so we shall start this section with a digression. It is, it would seem, impossible to make purely historical judgments on the question of St. Thomas' existentialism. What will seem historically probable if one agrees that judgmental knowledge of existence is in fact (not simply for St. Thomas) grounds for maintaining the metaphysical theory of esse will not seem so if one disagrees. All that the present study is attempting to show is that the essentialist-existentialist dichotomy is not a useful category of historical interpretation for those who are not Thomists. Perhaps it is not even useful for those Thomists who are opposed to Gilson. Yet those who have seen for themselves that the Thomist theory of existence is somehow implicit in the judgmental knowledge of existence, and that the rest of the metaphysics follows validly from this theory, will be strongly, and rightly, inclined to hold that the existential interpretation of St. Thomas is historically true. It will be right for them to do so, for if Aquinas arrived at what they believe are correct conclusions, they will have no alternative but to suppose that he started from what seems to be the one place from which such conclusions can validly be drawn. Others, however, who for one reason or another are uncertain 101 First part in Franciscan Studies XVII (1957) pp. 1—22. 107 ??8G. LINDBECK about the truth of these contentions, will not be able legitimately to conclude so readily that Aquinas "starts with existence" in the sense indicated above. They will want to know if he himself holds that the full doctrine of the actus essendi is somehow implicit in the knowledge of esse expressed in the act of judging. This brings us to a second point. It will be recalled that, for St. Thomas , knowledge of existence is indeed expressed in judgments; knowledge of essence, in concepts. Thus the distinction between essence andexistence corresponds to that between the two acts of the intellect. It will be recalled also that the act of judging gains a peculiar significance in this system, for in grasping esse, it grasps not simply facticity, but the central act of a substance. Was it then awareness of the fundamental importance of the existential act as this is known in judgment which impelled St. Thomas to develop his doctrine of existence and being, or did the doctrine result from other considerations, and then in turn influence his treatment of judgment ? St. Thomas does not tell us. The causal sequence may be read either way. It might be thought that this silence on the part of St. Thomas tells overwhelmingly against the existential interpretation, but this is not so. St. Thomas may have had a systematic philosophy — at least, that is the assumption on which philosophical study of him proceeds — but he never wrote it. His philosophy must be reconstructed from the use he makes of it in writings which are primarily theological. In answering questions, he frequently makes use of arguments which are drawn from both faith and reason. Often propositions which stand as the conclusion of oneargument figure in otherplaces in the proofs oftheir previous premises. It could scarcely be otherwise when commentaries and Summae, rather than continuous expositions, were the chief literary forms. In view of this, it is quite possible that Aquinas "starts with existence" even though he does not explicitly say so. More than that, one of the things that makes the existential interpretation so bafflingly...