Abstract
Two features common to many auctions are the use of reserve prices and the existence of secondary markets for the goods being sold. Even in simple symmetric settings, the combination of these features can preclude existence of an equilibrium in symmetric separating bidding strategies. With a reserve price sufficiently far below the maximum (endogenous) valuation, a symmetric equilibrium still exists, but with some types pooling at the reserve. The optimal reserve price depends not only on the joint distribution of bidders' information before and after the auction, but also on how surplus is divided in the secondary market. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D44, C7, L1, D82
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