Abstract
AbstractThe partial takedown phenomenon associated with bank loan commitments is examined in a dynamic context in which banks adjust commitment prices to client takedown behavior. The optimal takedown is an increasing function of client riskiness and a decreasing function of the time the client plans to remain with its present bank and the cost of switching to a new bank. Since the bank's learning is cumulative, the longer a client remains with its bank the smaller is the commitment price adjustment resulting from an aberrant takedown. The enhanced commitment price certainty, obtained with longevity of the client relationship, helps to explain client reluctance to switch banks. Since the optimal takedown is an increasing function of client riskiness under adaptive pricing, such pricing may serve the added purpose of providing information on client risk.
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