Abstract

We study the solution concepts of partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibria. The partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibrium is axiomatically characterized by using notions of rationality, consistency and converse consistency with regard to reduced games. We also establish sufficient conditions for which partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibria exist in supermodular games. Finally, we provide an application to strategic network formation where such solution concepts may be useful.

Highlights

  • The questions of coalition formation and cooperation are central to the theory of strategic behavior.When a subset of the agents forms a coalition, they often behave “cooperatively” in the sense that they choose and implement a joint course of action

  • It is assumed that coalitions are given, and each coalition, rather than maximizing its individual payoff, maximizes a group payoff function, which can range from a simple sum of individual payoff functions (Mallozzi and Tijs [1,2,3]) to a vector valued function choosing points on the Pareto frontier of the individual payoffs of the members of the coalition (Ray and Vohra [4], Ray [5])

  • Even though we focus on the partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibrium for the sake of exposition, a similar result can be obtained with the partial cooperative

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Summary

Introduction

The questions of coalition formation and cooperation are central to the theory of strategic behavior.When a subset of the agents forms a coalition, they often behave “cooperatively” in the sense that they choose and implement a joint course of action. We prove the existence of partial cooperative Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria in supermodular games. In case these games are not supermodular, we show that a partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibrium exists if the strategy sets are compact, payoff functions are continuous and there exists a Nash equilibrium at the second stage of the game.

Results
Conclusion

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