Parliamentary Intention: Deciphering Its Role in Statutory Interpretation in the Australian Constitutional Context

Abstract

Abstract Parliamentary intention is a central aspect of statutory interpretation despite the many questions that exist concerning its normative role and desirability. In Lacey v. Attorney-General (Qld) and Zheng v. Cai, the High Court of Australia sought to diminish the role of objective parliamentary intention in statutory interpretation by alluding to a need for interpretive principles to be based on an understanding of the broader constitutional framework. This article argues that parliamentary intention has an important role to play within the modern statutory interpretation approach as adopted in Australia. Particularly, it is argued that an over-reliance upon statutory interpretation presumptions as a proxy for interpreting the legal meaning of statutes as opposed to an inquiry to discern parliamentary intention as informed by text, context, and purpose, leads to questionable interpretive results. Parliamentary intention is also consistent with the broader constitutional constraints as alluded by the High Court with respect to constitutional values such as the separation of powers between the judicial and legislative branch, and statutes being a product of an exercise of legislative power by democratically elected members of Parliament.