Abstract

In a previous article in this Journal, I discussed the prospects for the stabilization of democracy in the Federal Republic of Germany. I considered the factors which I thought to be favourable, and then noted certain problematic features inherent in both the constitutional structure of the Federal Republic and in the political praxis—the “unwritten constitution”—as it has developed under the chancellorship of Konrad Adenauer. Some of these danger points will be the subject of the present paper. Our concern will be with certain structural weaknesses which are, so to speak, built into the system of government, structural features which are independent of issues and ideologies.A brief commentary on certain recent events will serve as background for our discussion. In the election campaign of 1961 one observed a rather desperate attempt by the Social Democrats (SPD) to broaden their support among the intellectuals and the petite bourgeoisie, and also the farmers, by modifying their economic programme to such an extent that very little was left of specifically socialistic propositions. Marx was relegated to history; the party made it very clear that it is no longer a Marxist party. No longer does the party demand socialization of the “means of production” except in cases where private enterprise cannot meet the needs of the community. On the contrary, as a major “plank” in its election platform, it advocates a wider distribution of property by a new scheme of profit-sharing. In its foreign policy the party has abandoned its former proposals for gradually intensified contacts with the East German regime, and in striving for a “joint foreign policy” has come very close to the course of the Adenauer government.

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