Abstract
It has recently been argued by Paul Thagard (1986) that parallel computational models of cognition demonstrate the falsity of the popular theory of mind known as functionalism. It is my contention that his argument is seriously mistaken and rests on a misunderstanding of the functionalist position. While my primary aim is to defend functionalism from Thagard's attack, in the process I hope to provide some much needed clarification of matters both philosophical and computational. Since I intend to untangle issues that are often troublesome in cognitive science, the paper should prove useful even for those unfamiliar with Thagard's original piece.
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