Paradoxien und die Vergegenständlichung von Begriffen – zu Freges Unterscheidung zwischen Begriff und Gegenstand

Abstract

In this paper I discuss Frege's distinction between objects and concepts and suggest a solution of Frege's paradox of the concept horse. The expression ''the concept horse'' is not eliminated and the concept is not identified with its extension, but the concept is identified with the sense of the corresponding predicate. This solution fits better into a fregean ontology and philosophy of language than alternative solutions and allows for a general answer to the question why Frege's system is infected with Russell's paradox. Russell's paradox is caused by the reification of a concept. Certain problems of modern set theory seem to have a similar cause. Eine weithin sichtbare Warnungstafel muss aufgerichtet werden: niemand lasse sich einfallen, einen Begriff in einen Gegenstand zu verwandeln! Gottlob Frege